The irreversibility in a statistical system is traced to its probabilistic evolution, and the molecular chaos assumption is not its unique consequence as is commonly believed. Under the assumption that the rate of change · pi(t) of the ith microstate probability pi(t) vanishes only as t → ∞, we prove that the entropy of a system at constant energy cannot decrease with time.
One of the outstanding problems in theoretical physics is the demonstration of thermodynamic irreversibility of Clausius's second law of thermodynamics [1] . Its resolution is vital as the second law, whether treated as an axiom or as a law, determines the way Nature evolves. What makes the second law so unique is that its irreversibility is in stark contrast with reversibility obeyed by classical or quantum mechanics governing all processes in Nature; the only known exception is some Kaon decay over a short period of time. As Loschmidt [2] argued, thermodynamic irreversibility contradicts the reversibility principle; thus, we may have to abandon one of them. Nature may be perfect, but our description of any macroscopic part of it requires a probabilistic approach due to external noise; see later. It was first pointed out by Kröning [3] , and later developed by Boltzmann [4] ; see [5, 6] for excellent reviews. It was the first approach in physics that established that fundamental laws of Nature need not be strictly deterministic. Many phenomena at the microscopic level such as the nuclear decay are also known to require a probabilistic approach for their understanding. Thus, the probabilistic interpretation is not just a consequence of a macroscopic nature of the system. Nevertheless, it has to be exploited for a proper understanding of the second law. To appreciate this, we note that the Gibbs formulation of the entropy S(t) is
where p i (t) is the probability of the ith microstate at time t; the sum is over all distinct W microstates. According to the second law, the entropy of an isolated system cannot decrease with time; see OA in Fig. 1 . The probabilities change until the equilibrium is attained asymptotically when S(t) → ln W , its maximum possible value, as t → ∞, and all microstates have the same probability:
where the dot denotes the derivative with respect to time. It is not just the microstates themselves, but their probabilities of occurrence that determine the entropy. As we demonstrate here, not appreciating this fact has given rise to the irreversibility paradox of Loschmidt. There have been several attempts to explain irreversibility such as the Boltzmann H-theorem, coarse-graining,
Schematic behavior of S(t) as a function of time t. Starting at O (t = 0), OA and OB show the symmetric growth of S(t) in future and under time reversal at t = 0. If we reverse time later at t = t0 + t ′ by setting t ′ → −t ′ , then O0C shows the growth of the entropy above its value S(t0) at t = t0; the entropy does not retrace O0O, as would be required by time-reversal invariance.
the Brussels School of Prigogine, to name a few; see [7] for an excellent summary of these approaches. In particular, Boltzmann argued that time-reversibility remains intact, except that the time required to observe it is so long that it will never occur in one's lifetime. This is the customary mechanical approach taken in statistical mechanics for an isolated system, where statistical methods (such as the use of ensembles, molecular chaos, etc.) are used only as a convenience for treating a macroscopic system, while deeply believing in its time-reversible evolution as a mechanical system. This is apparent from the extensive use of the Liouville theorem as a framework in developing statistical mechanics as a tool [8] . Our stochastic approach will deviate from this customary mechanical approach in simple but important ways. The origin of this probabilistic behavior is the stochastic interaction with the environment, no matter how weak [8, 9] , whose immediate consequence is to make interparticle collisions also stochastic. We only consider very weak environmental interaction; otherwise, separating the system from the environment will not be useful [8, 9] . The introduction of molecular chaos (MC) by Burbury [10] and later adopted by Boltzmann [11] to explain irreversibility, however, elevates MC as the source for irreversibility. Unfortunately, the use of MC helps to conceal, rather than reveal, the true origin of irreversibility, as we will argue below. We will establish that (i) irreversibility is caused by stochasticity in the system which arise from interactions with the environment, (ii) MC is one of many possible manifestations of it, and not the only one, and (iii) the entropy cannot decrease if we assume (2) .
The significance and relevance of our stochastic approach to study system's evolution is convincingly demonstrated by the very simple but highly celebrated Kac ring model [12, 13] , which contains N balls of two colors A and B, localized on sites of a ring; there are no empty sites. A microstate i represents an ordered sequence of the colors of the balls. The time evolution occurs by balls moving in unison one step clockwise during each time interval ∆. To include the environmental effects, we consider F flippers with fixed positions on the links between neighboring sites that flip the colors of balls (A⇔B) without any bias as they pass through the flippers. The movement of each ball is deterministic, even when it passes through a flipper. In one time step, the microstate i evolves into another unique microstate i ′ . We denote this time evolution by a one-to-one mapping i → i ′ . It can be inverted to give the backward evolution i ′ ← i under time reversal (t → −t) by balls moving counter-clockwise; there is no effect on flippers' ability to flip colors under reversal as the balls pass through them. Thus, time reversal will generate uniquely any past state of the system so there is time-reversal invariance. The number of distinct microstates of balls is W = 2 N . For very weak external interactions, we need the flipper density ϕ ≡ F/N ≪ 1. Let A j and B j denote the number of A and B balls and a j and b j the number of A and B balls with a flipper ahead of them at time t j ≡ j∆; the index j should not be confused with i for a microstate. Obviously, A j + B j ≡ N , and a j + b j ≡ F , so that we can treat only one species (we choose B) as independent. It is easy to establish the following recursion relation (RR) B j+1 ≡ B j +a j −b j . Introducing the densities P j = B j /N and p j+1 = b j /F, we can rewrite the RR for P j :
This RR cannot be solved in a closed form, since it involves the quantity p j which is determined by the initial microstate and j. To proceed further, we need to supplemented it by some known p j . The most direct way is to express p j as a function of P j . We will call such an assumed relationship the reduction assumption. One such choice, following Burbury and Boltzmann, is that of MC, which for the current model leads to p j ≡ P j [12, 13] : the density of any color is independent of whether a flipper is ahead or not. However, many other forms can be utilized.
We will choose the following form, merely for simplicity,
here, θ j ≡ θ(ϕ, P j ) is some arbitrary real positive function, although with some strong restrictions to be detailed below. It includes MC (θ = 1) as a special case. It is one out of many possible choices, but is sufficient to make our point that the molecular chaos assumption is not unique for irreversibility to emerge. The functional form of θ j does not depend on time explicitly; implicitly, it may depend on j through P j . The RR now becomes
, where θ, x stand for θ j (ϕ, x), P j , respectively. The fix point (FP) x * of the RR is given by f (x * ) = x * . The restriction f (x) ≤ 1 strongly restricts θ. In addition, we require that (a) θ(ϕ, x) has no zero over 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, (b) the slope at x = x * = 1/2 satisfies 0 < f ′ (x * ) < 1, and (c) f (x) is monotonic. Satisfying all these requirements will usually impose certain restrictions on the allowed values of ϕ. For example, for θ = θ 0 =constant, it is easy to see that ϕ ≤ 1/2θ 0 . With these requirements, the schematic form of f (x) is as shown in Fig. 2 ; its convexity is not relevant. The RR can now be solved recursively to obtain the limiting value P eq of P j as j → ∞, which represents the FP. To find x * of the RR x j+1 = f (x j ), we proceed graphically and follow the arrows in Fig. 2 , as we approach x * . The starting point 0 may be above x * , as shown in the figure, or below (not shown); in both cases, we converge to the FP x * = 1/2. Thus, x * is an attractive FP and determines the equilibrium state in the model.
The form of f ( P j ) is determined by the dynamics of the system; despite this, the FP, i.e., the equilibrium state is the same for all dynamics described by the above class of functions f ( P j ). This class of f ( P j ) also gives a monotonic decreasing (increasing) sequence of P j , which converges to the FP P eq = x * = 1/2, if the initial state 0 is above (below) x * . The FP P eq = 1/2 results from our adopted unbiased dynamics. The monotonic behavior is in accordance with our fundamental postulate (2). Such a behavior, which follows from our reduction assumption, creates a contradiction with the time reversal invariance of (3). What is even more puzzling is that the reduction assumption has no explicit stochastic ingredient. Thus, the RR appears to have a completely deterministic form: we can reverse the arrows in Fig. 2 and retrieve the entire history [ P j ≡ f −1 ( P j+1 )]. Despite this, we have an irreversible asymptotic (j → ∞ or t → ∞) approach to equilibrium brought about by the reduction assumption.
To understand how the reduction assumption leads to irreversibility, we proceed as follows. We change the above deterministic model to a stochastic model by introducing stochasticity: We make the positions of the flippers random at each time step ∆ to mimic stochastic o angle represents x. To find the fix point x * , one follows the arrows 0 → 1 → 2 → 3, · · · , starting at 0. The time evolution is due to interactions with the exterior (ϕ = 0). When there is no external interaction (ϕ = 0), the state never changes with time, as expected. It is clear that it will take infinte number of iterations of the recursion relation xj+1 = f (xj ) to find the fix point. Under time-reversal, one follows the arrows in reverse · · · , 3 → 2 → 1 → 0 to retrieve the initial point 0.
external interactions. This means that there is a flipper present with a probability ϕ ahead of each ball. We also assume balls to be uncorrelated, and focus on one of the balls. Let P j denote the probability that its color is B at time t j ; this probability should not be confused with the density P j above for the deterministic system; there was no stochasticity earlier. Each flipper flips color with probability θ j ≡ θ(ϕ, P j ), and does not flip it with probability 1 − θ j . Then, it is easy to see that
which is identical to the RR (3) for the deterministic model subjected to (4) if we identify the probability P j with the density P j . One can also interpret the above RR by assuming that there is a flipper on each link with certainty and it flips the color with probability ϕθ j and does not flip it with probability 1 − ϕθ j . As before, the stochastic RR (5) converges monotonically to equilibrium (P j → P eq = 1 2 ) as t j → ∞, see Fig. 2 , so that there are equal numbers of balls of the two colors. Thus, the probability of any of the W = 2 N microstates is exactly (1/2) N in accordance with our fundamental postulates (2). It is clear now that the reduction assumption (we have considered one of many possible classes of f ) is really a consequence of our stochastic model. A class different than (4) relating p j with P j may result in a different equilibrium state. However, even in this case, the dynamics will be irreversible. Thus, there is nothing unique about the Burbury-Boltzmann MC assumption or our reduction assumption as far as irreversibility is concerned. The former is really one of many conceivable reduction forms that emerge as a consequence of an irreversible dynamics. We should point out that (5) can be inverted for the probabilities:P j ≡ f −1 (P j+1 ). Graphically, this requires reversing the arrows in Fig. 2 , which will eventually yield the initial probability P 0 . However, as we will see below, this inversion of the probability RR does not correspond to time-reversal evolution of the microstates. Thus, it says nothing about the reversibility of the second law. For the molecular chaos case, it is easy to show
Now that we have seen that MC is no longer a unique manifestation of irreversibility, we need to look for a much deeper cause of irreversibility, as a variety of dynamics will lead to irreversibility. Thus, a particular dynamics itself cannot be the unique cause of irreversibility. We propose that it is the stochastic nature of a statistical system that is responsible for time irreversibility [9] . Its presence invalidates the time reversal invariance. We now justify this proposal. Let us first consider a deterministic evolution in which an initial microstate i at time t = 0 evolves in a unique fashion. From (1), S(0) ≡ 0. Let us consider times that are integral multiple t j ≡ j∆ in terms of some fixed interval ∆. Then i evolves into a microstate i j (i → i j ) at a future time t j with certainty, i.e. with probability one, to use the language of probability. Again, using (1), S(t j ) ≡ 0. The deterministic dynamics possesses the property of time-reversal invariance. Since the evolution i → i j is one-to-one, strict causality ("from the same antecedents follow the same consequents") is maintained and the mapping can be inverted at any time. Thus, the forward evolution i → i 1 → i 2 → · · · → i j of an initial microstate can be uniquely inverted to give i j ← i j−1 ← i j−2 ← · · · ← i 1 ← i, and we recover the initial microstate in this reversal. The entropy in this reversal remains constant= 0, which is consistent with the time-reversal invariance. The macroscopic irreversibility observed in a macroscopic system should also not be confused with the chaotic behavior seen in a system with only a few degrees of freedom, the latter being purely deterministic and, therefore, should not be considered an example of time-irreversibility from what we said above.
For the concept of entropy to be useful requires a particular kind of probabilistic approach in which the evolution must not be deterministic, even though one can use densities such as P j above for a deterministic system as a suggestive probability; rather, it must be genuinely stochastic. As Landau observes [8] , even an isolated system is not truly deterministic in Nature. A real system must be confined by a real container, which forms the exterior of the system. The container cannot be a perfect insulator. Moreover, it itself will introduce environmental noise in the system. Thus, there are always stochastic disturbances going on in a real system due to the exterior, which cannot be eliminated, though they can be minimized. (For the Kac ring model, we must ensure ϕ ≪ 1, but we must not have ϕ ≡ 0; in the latter case, the probabilities P j will never change and the entropy will remain constant as we have a deterministic evolution.) For quantum systems, this requires considering the Landau-von Neumann density matrix, rather than eigenstates [8] . The derivation in [8] clearly shows the uncertainty introduced by the presence of "outside". The latter is not being part of the system, just as the flippers are not used in identifying the microstates and their density does not affect the FP in the Kac model.
We do not have to consider the actual nature of the noise; all that is required is its mere presence. One can think of ϕ in the Kac model as the strength of stochastic noise. As long as ϕ = 0 (or ϕθ = 0), the model will always converge to the FP, i.e. will equilibrate. It is only in this case that the entropy will increase as the probabilities of various microstates change in time, as we prove below. The actual nature of the noise will only determine the form of the dynamics, but not the final equilibrium state, which remains oblivious to the actual noise or the dynamics. This is what allows the statistical mechanical approach to make predictions about the equilibrium state. Since the evolution is stochastic, a microstate i makes a "jump" to one of the W microstates in the microstate set {I}. The mapping i {I} is one-to-many, with each of the possible i ′ ∈ {I} occurring with certain probabilities. Because of the one-to-many nature, the mapping cannot be inverted to study time-reversal, and strict causality is destroyed. To appreciate this observation, let us consider the Kac ring model. Under time-reversal, the balls move counter-clockwise, but flippers continue to flip colors with the same probability ϕθ. Thus, i ′ gives rise to two possibilities so the mapping still remains one-to-many, which causes irreversibility:P j+1 does not go to P j . Thus, time reversal and arrow reversals are not the same.
Let us reverse time at t = t 0 > 0, where the entropy is S(t 0 ); see Fig. 1 . Then all possible microstate in the set {I} will not uniquely jump back into i; rather each of the possible i ′ will stochastically jump to any of the W microstates in the set {I}, and the entropy will continue to increase from its value S(t 0 ). This is shown by O 0 C in Fig. 1 . The entropy will not follow O 0 O. The stochasticity destroys time-reversal invariance of the dynamics at t 0 > 0. The situation is different at t = 0, when the system was initially prepared in some non-equilibrium state. If we follow its evolution in past and in future separately, we will discover that the entropy continues to increase until equilibrium is reached in both cases; see OA and OB in Fig. 1 . Thus, time-reversal invariance is valid with respect to t = 0, but not when t > 0.
We now consider a general system, which is initially prepared so that the initial probabilities p i0 ≡ p i (t = 0) of various microstates are not zero. From (2), we see that if the initial probabilities p i0 ≥ 1/W for some microstates, then these probabilities must decrease ( · p i ≤ 0). On the other hand, if p i0 < 1/W for some microstates, then these probabilities must increase ( · p i ≥ 0). Accordingly, we partition microstates into two distinct groups G (containing microstates with p i ≥ 1/W ) and L (containing microstates with p i < 1/W ). We will assume p 0 is the smallest of all probabilities in the group G. We treat p 0 to be the dependent variable, while all other p i 's, i > 0, are treated as independent variables, so that p 0 ≥ 1/W is given by p 0 = 1 − i>0 p i . We find that dS/dt = i>0 · p i (dS/dp i ) = i∈G · p i ln(p 0 /p i )+ i∈L · p i ln(p 0 /p i ).
As the two factors in each of the two sums have the same sign, dS/dt ≥ 0. This establishes that the entropy continues to increase until · p i (t) → 0 for all microstates, in which case (2) finally becomes satisfied. During timereversal dynamics, the derivatives · p i (t) will have changed their signs, making dS/dt ≤ 0, so that the second law is not violated.
For a deterministic evolution, the entropy remains a constant of motion [9] . This is consistent with the Liouville theorem according to which the volume of the phase space is a constant of motion under deterministic dynamics, and which also does not violate the second law. In our opinion, the stochastic interpretation adopted here easily explains Maxwell's idea [14] that molecular motion is "perfectly irregular"; this irregularity must be present in order for the system to behave irreversibly. Our approach is sufficient to show irreversibility; one does not really need to use the oscillatory behavior of the H-curve [8] as proposed by Boltzmann to resolve the paradox.
